Anti-corruption in Corruptocracies: The Nigerian Experience

A regime of corruption

‘Corruptocracy’ describes a government or state dominated by corrupt oligarchs. Corruptocracies are most common in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Many countries in these regions have for decades, remained under the dominance of a corrupt oligarchy that exercises absolute control over political power and public wealth. But even in developed countries, traces of corruptocracy may be found. For example, some consider the political finance regime in the US which enables big individual and corporate financiers to bankroll the election of political leaders, as a marker of a corruptocracy. Once in office, public officials are believed to pander to the private interests of these financiers to the detriment of the larger American population.

Whether in the developing or developed world, corruptocracies have victims – the public. The question, therefore, is not whether there can be adverse outcomes where governance is steeped in corruption, but how far-reaching the outcomes can be. The more acute a corruptocracy, the more far-reaching its consequences. While the consequences are clear, it is important to ponder if anti-corruption efforts stand any chance of succeeding in acute corruptocracies. What insights could the experience of Nigeria provide?

Nigeria’s dismal ranking in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index in the past two decades indicates that corruption remains a major governance challenge in the country. Widespread unemployment, nationwide insecurity, growing absolute poverty, poor healthcare, etc., have been linked to corruption in governance. The persistence of elite corruption does not suggest the absence of anti-corruption efforts. Since 1999 (the year of the return to democracy), Nigeria has had a chain of failed anti-corruption programs. Though scholars are divided over why this is the case, three overlooked attributes of the Nigerian corruptocracy may explain the high mortality rate of anti-corruption programs. These are the liberalisation of corruption; corruption as a political stabiliser; and the vertical flow of proceeds of corruption.

Liberalisation of corruption

Until 1999, Nigeria was governed for the most part by the military, with stints of failed democratic governance. Military leaders, corrupt but not known for big government, restricted participation in corruption to a selectorate – a tiny band of military elites and their civilian cronies. Democracy expanded the machinery of governance as it opened multiple executive, legislative and judicial positions in the three tiers of government. A thing to note which the literature has scarcely acknowledged is that the return to democracy not only liberalised power but also democratised elite participation in corruption. More elites now have access to unproductive rent apportioned under the coordination of a dominant political party, typically the party in power.  

Corruption as a political stabiliser

Nigeria is deeply polarised along ethnic and religious lines, making political stability tenuous. Consociationalism hinges on more than just power-sharing among sectional leaders but also the careful apportionment of rent – legal and illicit – among these ethno-regional actors. Hence, intra-elite disputations are often over perceived inequitable rent allocation. Disadvantaged elites may stir up the polity to compel favourable rent reallocation. External actors who desire a seat at the table get noticed only if they demonstrate the capacity to upset the tenuous stability. When that happens, the oligarchy makes internal adjustments to accommodate new interests. If the oligarchy is unyielding or the actors deem the reallocation unacceptable, the disgruntled break away and reconstitute as an opposing elite cluster (a challenger political party). The next major elections become a do-or-die struggle for dominance between the old and new elite formations.

The vertical flow of proceeds of corruption

A politician’s place in the national oligarchy and access to adequate rent depends to a great degree on the weight of their sociopolitical capital – ethnic and religious support base. The size of this support base is as crucial as the ease of mobilisation when the politician must demonstrate their capacity to strain the delicate stability, counteract the actions of the government, or churn out votes during elections. Like a mechanical device, this political machine must be oiled to maintain functionality. The politician – the patron – devices informal schemes through which proceeds from corruption flow to their support base – the clientele. This comes as support outside formal institutional arrangements: cash or food handouts; employment, especially in the civil service; coverage for hospital, marriage, funeral, childbirth or christening ceremonies. With pervasive poverty and an almost non-existent formal welfare system, such transactional exchanges have become deeply entrenched. Therefore, if this informal welfare system is resourced, the political machine stays active and ready to mobilise.

Nigeria’s failed anti-corruption attempts

The failure of anti-corruption enforcement in Nigeria in the last two and a half decades tends to reflect the interplay of these factors. The polity witnessed what could be termed the liberalisation of corruption and its instrumentalisation for elite organisation and consensus building coordinated by the then-dominant Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). This party was an agglomeration of politicians from across the country. Under the party’s watch, elite corruption thrived in monumental proportions between 1999 and 2015. Anti-corruption initiatives mostly targeted the opposition and spared members of the PDP or those associated with the party who constituted the oligarchy. Actors outside this oligarchic structure who demonstrated the capacity to undermine the fragile stability were swiftly absorbed. To borrow from the field of cosmology, anti-corruption programs orbited in a “Goldilocks zone” where they appeared not too weak to satisfy international development partners whose development assistance was predicated on Nigeria’s commitment to tackle corruption, and not too strong, to preserve the fragile elite consensus upon which the tenuous political stability hinges.

The inevitable and eventual collapse of elite consensus and the fracture of the PDP in 2013-2014 birthed the All Progressives Congress (APC), setting the polity up for a two-dominant party showdown in the general elections of 2015. The APC would emerge victorious, becoming the new hegemonic party. The APC-led federal government initiated a promising fight against corruption. This new anti-corruption vigour would earn praise from international observers, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. However, this anti-corruption zest had nothing to do with the party’s intention to curb corruption but more with the personal agenda of then-President Muhammadu Buhari whose decades-long political aspiration was to end elite corruption in Nigeria. The anti-corruption attempt soon buckled seemingly under the weight of elite and citizen counter-reactions.

The administration contended with diverse threats to security and political stability, including heightened terrorist activities, attacks on oil infrastructure leading to huge revenue losses, and renewed secessionist agitations. The administration blamed aggrieved looters for stoking the threats to derail the anti-graft war. At the same time, segments of the citizenry assailed the anti-corruption program through the 'BringBackOurCorruption' counter-campaign that dominated the social media space and daily conversations. Proponents of this counter-campaign blamed the anti-corruption program for exacerbating poverty and hunger. Citizens' hostility to the fight against corruption seemed like a subconscious acknowledgement of the extent of the vertical flow of proceeds of corruption and how the anti-corruption program may have hindered this flow for at least two years.

The anti-corruption program not only capitulated but also, the administration became tainted with corruption. Revelations emerged of major corruption scandals involving key officials in the presidency and the governing APC. Like in the PDP years, anti-corruption agencies turned a blind eye to these scandals. It became more convenient to focus the anti-corruption ire on members of the opposition PDP, some of whom would later defect to the APC, and then their prosecution stopped. Again, Nigeria failed in another attempt to combat elite corruption as the anti-corruption program veered back to the Goldilocks zone. 

Being context-aware

Examining the contexts in which anti-corruption programs operate in acute corruptocracies such as Nigeria could help understand why such programs may fail and frame context-aware anti-corruption measures. Like Nigeria, anti-corruption in many severe corruptocracies, especially in the developing world, may be constrained by factors under-acknowledged in the dominant theorisations on why these countries are in winless tussles with elite corruption. While conclusions should only be drawn with sufficient research, it may be beneficial to interrogate how some measure of stability is maintained in deeply divided countries that also experience high levels of corruption in governance. Could there be a correlation between pervasive elite corruption, the maintenance of tenuous stability, and the high mortality rate of anti-corruption initiatives?